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Abstract
In this paper we consider symmetric games where a large number of players can be in
any one of d states. We derive a limiting mean field model and characterize its main prop-
erties. This mean field limit is a system of coupled ordinary differential equations with
initial-terminal data. For this mean field problem we prove a trend to equilibrium theorem,
that is convergence, in an appropriate limit, to stationary solutions. Then we study the N+1-
player problem, which the mean field model attempts to approximate. Our main result is the
convergence as N → ∞ of the mean field model and an estimate of the rate of convergence.
We end the paper with some further examples for potential mean field games.
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1 Introduction
Mean field games is a recent area of research started by Peter Caines and his co-workers [HMC06],
[HCM07], and independently by Pierre Louis Lions and Jean Michel Lasry [LL06a, LL06b, LL07a,
LL07b] which attempts to understand the limiting behavior of systems involving very large num-
bers of rational agents which play dynamic games under partial information and symmetry as-
sumptions. Inspired by ideas in statistical physics, in this class of models the individual player’s
contributions are encoded into a mean field that contains all relevant statistical properties about
the ensemble.
The literature on mean field games and its applications is growing fast. For recent surveys see
[LLG10b] or [Car10], and reference therein. Mean field games arise in the study of growth theory in
economics [LLG10a, ML11], production of exaustible resources [LLG10b], or environmental policy
[ALT], for instance, and it is likely that in the future they will play an important role in economics
and population models. There is also a growing interest in numerical methods for these problems
[ALT], [AD10]. A related concept, called oblivious equilibrium, corresponds to the case where
players are assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long-run
average industry state and stationary equilibrium models were introduced and studied in detail
in, respectively, [WBVR08] and [AJW11]. Mean field models correspond to the limit of N player
games under symmetry assumptions. The Markov perfect equilibrium notion for these games has
been studied (mostly in discrete time or stationary setting) in [PS09, Liv02, MT01, Str93], and
references therein. In [PM01, Sle01] symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium are also considered,
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and in the last paper the case with an infinite number of players is studied. In [Kap95] the passage
from discrete time to continuous time is considered for N players in a war of attrition problem.
The techniques in the present paper are, however, substantially different from the above references.
In this paper we begin by presenting a mean field model for a continuous time dynamic game
between a large number of rational agents, which we call players. These are allowed to switch
between a finite number of states, looking forward to optimize certain functionals, which depend
on the statistical distribution of the other players. We discuss the concept of Nash equilibrium,
which allow us to derive a system of ordinary differential equations for the distribution of the
players, as well their value function. After, we consider the N +1-player game, which corresponds
to the previous problem before taking the mean field limit. In the N + 1-player game each player
knows only the state but not the identity of the remaining players. We are particularly interested
in understanding the limit of the N +1 player game as the number of players increases to infinity.
In discrete time, finite number of state mean field models were studied in [GMS10]. In his PhD
thesis, [Gue09], O. Gue´ant considered a problem with two states, modeling the labor market. In
this work he considered a continuum of individuals and a labor market consisting of 2 sectors. Each
individual has to decide on which sector he or she is going to work. This model consists in a coupled
systems of ordinary differential equations of the type that will be derived in §2. More recently in
[Gue11b], and [Gue11a] several discrete state problems have been also studied in detail, namely
its connection with systems of conservation laws. Further models with discrete state space were
also considered in [TBEA09], [HTAEA11]. In these models, each individual in a large population
interacts with randomly selected players. This interaction determines the instantaneous payoff
for all involved players. In particular these authors establish several very interesting limit results.
We should note, however that these last works do not study mean field games in the sense of this
paper, namely they lack the forward-backward structure of the equilibrium as in the works by
Caines, Lions-Lasry, among others.
We start in §2 by describing the mean field game. We derive a mean field model for the optimal
switching policy of a reference player given the fraction θ(t) ∈ [0, 1]d of players in each of d states.
Then we introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium turns out to be determined
by a coupled system of ordinary differential equations, where one equation governs the evolution
of θ, and is subjected to initial conditions, whereas the other equation models the evolution of a
value function and has terminal data. We call this problem the initial-terminal value problem.
These models are similar to the ones in [Gue11b], [Gue11a]. Initial terminal value problems are in
fact a general feature in many mean field game problems, see for instance [LL06a, LL06b, LL07a],
though not very common in ODE problems. In fact, existence and uniqueness of solutions is not
immediate from the general ODE theory but, adapting the methods of Lions and Lasry we were
successful in establishing both. We also study a class of contractive mean field games for which
a-priori bounds on suitable norms can be established. In particular under this condition one can
prove existence of stationary solutions. The main result of this section is a trend to equilibrium
theorem, in the spirit of the results in [GMS10]. The proof relies on a reverse Gronwall inequality
(i.e. when an integral of a function is controlled by the function at the endpoints).
In §3 we consider the Nash equilibrium problem before taking a mean field limit, i.e. with a
finite number, N + 1, of players. As before we suppose that all players are identical and so the
game is symmetric with respect to permutation of the players. We adopt the point of view of a
reference player, which could be chosen as any one of the players. We assume that this player
(as any other) has access to the same information, namely, his/her own state at time t, given by
it ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., d}, and the number nt ∈ N
d of remaining players that are in the other states. The
objective of the reference player is to minimize, by controlling the process it, and given the process
nt, the expected value of the integral of a running cost function added to a terminal cost. We
assume that both it and nt are controlled non-time homogeneous coupled Markov chains. More
precisely, we suppose that N of the players have a fixed Markov switching strategy β, known by
the reference player, which then chooses a switching strategy α(β). This is a well know Markov
decision problem. The Nash equilibrium corresponds to α(β) = β, which can be characterized by
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a system of ordinary differential equations. In this setting the equilibrium is characterized by a
system of ordinary differential equations with a terminal condition. This system, as explained in
§5, can be seen as a discretized version of a partial differential equation (introduced by Lions in
his course in College de France and further studied by Gueant [Gue11b, Gue11a]) for the value
function that can be derived for the mean field model, as an alternative to the initial-terminal value
problem formulation. In addition to this characterization we prove various bounds, uniformly on
N , which then allow to address the passage to the limit problem, in §4.
In §4 we prove the main result of the paper, Theorem 7, which is the convergence as the
number of players N → ∞ in L2 of the N + 1-player model to the mean field model of §2. In a
different setting, convergence to MFG model was established by [KLY11] using very interesting
techniques from non-linear Markov chains. We should note that the techniques in that paper
do not apply to the problem we consider were, as our problem has a different structure. Our
convergence result, gives, for small T , a rate of convergence of the order 1√
N
. For the proof we
not need monotonicity assumptions. In particular this implies uniqueness of solution to the mean
field problem for small time. Our proof uses a double Gronwall-type inequality where part of the
integrand can be estimated forward in time, whereas other part can only be estimated backwards
in time.
In §5 we end this paper with an important class of examples, namely potential mean field
games. These have been studied in detail by Pierre Louis Lions (College de France course) and
also in [Gue11b, Gue11a]. For these mean field games several connections with Hamiltonian and
Lagrangian dynamics can be derived which have interesting applications to planning problems. We
also discuss a variational formulation in analogy to the results in [GSM11] and [GPSM11], as well
as some connections with partial differential equations, numerical methods and Hamilton-Jacobi
equations.
2 A mean field model
In this section we derive a mean field model which, as we will show later, corresponds to the limit
as the number of players tends to infinity of symmetric dynamic games with a finite number of
players.
We consider a continuous time dynamic game where a large number of players can be in any of d
states. The players can switch from state to state and their decisions depend on certain optimality
criteria which we will describe in the following. We suppose that all players are identical and so the
game is symmetric with respect to permutation of the players. Players only know its own position
and the fraction of players in each of the d states. Each player can control the transition rate
from one state to another and incurs in both a running cost and a terminal cost which depends
on its own state, on the state of the other players (through its distribution among states and not
on individual player’s states) as well as on the controls the player chooses.
We will fix one of the players which will be called the reference player. Because the game is
symmetric, the identity of this player is not important, and all other players have access to similar
information. We further assume the mean field hypothesis, that is, since the number of players
is very large, the only information available to the reference player is the distribution of players
given by a probability vector θ ∈ Sd, where Sd is the probability simplex{
θ1 + ...+ θd = 1 ,
θi ≥ 0 ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d .
Under the mean field hypothesis, the evolution of the vector θ can be approximated by an ordinary
differential equation as discussed in §2.1.
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2.1 Continuous time Markov process and the Kolmogorov equation
We suppose that the players distribution among states is given by a probability vector θ(t) ∈ Sd.
Let β(t) ∈ Rd×d represent a transition rate matrix depending on the time t, where βij(t) ≥ 0 if
i 6= j, and βii ≡ −
∑
j 6=i βij . We assume that the players switch from state to state according to
a continuous time (inhomogeneous) Markov process with transition rate matrix β, which for now
we suppose it is known. In the mean field limit, the fraction of players in each state θ satisfies the
Kolmogorov equation
dθi
dt
=
∑
j
θjβji . (1)
The previous equation is complemented by an initial condition θ(0) = θ0 ∈ S
d from which the
evolution of the distribution of players θβ : [0, T ]→ Sd is completely determined. For convenience,
controls are also identified with a vector β(i) ∈ Rd with the convention that βj(i) = βij , where
βj(i) denotes the j−th coordinate of β(i) .
2.2 Running and terminal costs
We fix now a reference player and consider the optimization problem according to his/her point
of view. We assume that the state of this player is driven by a continuous time discrete state
optimal control problem in which he/she controls the switching rates from state to state. These
switching rates are chosen in order to minimize a certain cost which is the sum of a running cost
and a terminal cost. The running cost depends on the player’s state, the switching rate, and the
fraction of players in each state. The terminal cost depends on the player’s terminal state as well
as the terminal distribution of players among states.
Let Id = {1, 2, 3, ..., d}. The running cost of the reference player whose state is i is given by
a cost c : Id × S
d × (R+0 )
d → R, c(i, θ, α), where θ ∈ Sd is the probability distribution of players
among states, and αj is the transition rate the reference player uses to change from state i to
state j. We suppose c is Lipschitz continuous in θ, with the Lipschitz constant (with respect to θ)
bounded independently of α. We suppose c is differentiable with respect to α, and that ∂c
∂α
(i, θ, α),
is Lipschitz with respect to θ, uniformly in α.
We also suppose that c(i, θ, α) does not depend on αi, is uniformly convex (on the remaining
coordinates), that is, for any i ∈ Id, θ ∈ S
d, α, α′ ∈ (R+0 )
d, with αj 6= α
′
j , for some j 6= i,
c(i, θ, α ′)− c(i, θ, α) ≥ ∇αc(i, θ, α) · (α ′ − α) + γ‖α ′ − α‖2. (2)
We suppose that c is superlinear on αj , j 6= i, that is,
lim
αj→∞
c(i, θ, α)
‖α‖
→ ∞.
The reference player has a terminal cost denoted by ψ : Id × S
d → R, ψi(θ). We suppose ψ is
Lipschitz continuous in θ, with the Lipschitz constant (with respect to θ) bounded independently
of α.
2.3 Single player control problem: the value function
Let T > 0 be the time duration of game. Suppose the players are distributed among the d states
according to the distribution probability θ : [0, T ] → Sd, which for now we assume to be known
by the reference player. Let
uiθ(t, α) = E
α
it=i
[∫ T
t
c(is, θ(s), α(s))ds + ψ
iT (θ(T ))
]
.
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We define the value function associated to θ, denoted by uθ : Id × [0, T ]→ R, as
uiθ(t) = min
α
uiθ(t, α), (3)
where is is a continuous time Markov chain controlled by α which corresponds to the state of the
reference player at time s, and Eα
it=i
is the expectation conditioned on the event it = i, given the
transition rate α. Here the minimization is performed over Markovian controls α(s) = α(is, s).
More precisely
P[is+h = j|is] = αj(s)h+ o(h)
where limh→0
o(h)
h
= 0. In §2.5 existence of optimal Markovian controls will be proved.
2.4 Definitions and preliminary results
Let ∆i : R
d → Rd be the difference operator on i, given by
∆iz = (z
1 − zi, ..., zd − zi) .
The infinitesimal generator of a finite state continuous time Markov chain, with transition rate
νij , acting on a function ϕ : Id → R, is given by
Aνi (ϕ) =
∑
j
νij(ϕ
j − ϕi) = νi· ·∆iϕ .
We define the generalized Legendre transform of the function c(i, θ, ·), as
h(z, θ, i) = min
µ∈(R+
0
)d
c(i, θ, µ) +
∑
j
µj(z
j − zi)
= min
µ∈(R+
0
)d
c(i, θ, µ) + µ ·∆iz . (4)
Because of the superlinearity and uniform convexity of c the function
α∗(z, θ, i) = argminµ∈(R+
0
)dc(i, θ, µ) + µ ·∆iz (5)
is well defined, except for its i−th coordinate, since (∆iz)
i = 0. We will denote the j-th entry of
the vector α∗(z, θ, i) as α∗j (z, θ, i), and for convenience and definitness we set
α∗i (z, θ, i) ≡ −
∑
j 6=i
α∗j (z, θ, i) . (6)
The definition (6) is consistent because c(i, θ, α) does not depend on the i-th entry of the vector
α, and for that reason (5) does not define α∗i (z, θ, i). The uniform convexity of c(i, θ, ·) shows that
α∗ is well defined. We will write h(∆iz, θ, i) and α∗(∆iz, θ, i) to stress the fact that h and α∗
depend only on ∆iz. Because
h(∆iz, θ, i) = h(z, θ, i)
there is no ambiguity of this notation.
The following Proposition is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. We have
a) If h is differentiable, for j 6= i
α∗j (∆iz, θ, i) =
∂h(∆iz, θ, i)
∂zj
,
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furthermore, in general, for all z and v
h(z + v, θ, i)− h(z, θ, i) ≤
∑
j
α∗j (z, θ, i) v
j, (7)
i.e. α∗j (z, θ, i) ∈ ∂
+
z h(z, θ, i), where ∂
+ denotes the superdiferential.
b) The function α∗ is Lipschitz in p and in θ. The Lipschitz constants are uniform. More
precisely,
‖α∗(p ′, θ, i)− α∗(p, θ, i)‖ ≤
1
γ
∥∥p ′ − p ∥∥ ∀ p, p ′, θ, i,
and
‖α∗(p, θ, i)− α∗(p, θ ′, i)‖ ≤
Kc
γ
∥∥θ − θ ′∥∥ , ∀ p, θ, θ ′, i.
where γ is the constant given by (2) and Kc is the Lipschitz constant of ∇αc.
c) The function h is locally Lipschitz in p and in θ. The Lipschitz constants are uniform if ∆z
is bounded.
2.5 Hamilton-Jacobi equation and a Verification Theorem
We continue to assume that θ : [0, T ]→ Sd is given. As in classical optimal control we introduce
now the Hamilton-Jacobi ODE: {
− du
i
dt
= h(∆iu, θ, i),
ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )).
(8)
This is a terminal value problem (TVP) consisting of a system of d coupled ODE´s with a terminal
condition given by ψ. It turns out, as Theorem 1 states, that the solution to this ODE is the value
function. Before proving Theorem 1 we begin by proving a maximum principle for the equation
(8), which will be also used to prove existence and uniqueness.
Proposition 2. If u is a solution to the HJ equation (8), and M = max
(i,θ)∈Id×Sd
|h(0, θ, i)|. Then
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T we have
‖u(t)‖ ≤ ‖u(T )‖+ 2M(T − t) ,
where ‖u(t)‖ = max
i∈Id
{|u1(t)|, . . . , |ud(t)|}.
Proof. Let u be a solution to (8). Let u˜ = u+ ρ(T − t). Then
−
du˜i
dt
= h (∆iu˜, θ, i) + ρ .
Let (i, t) be a minimum point of u˜ on Id × [0, T ]. We have u˜
j(t) − u˜i(t) ≥ 0 hence ∆iu˜ =
(u˜1(t)− u˜i(t), ..., u˜d(t)− u˜i(t)) ≥ 0. Therefore
−
du˜i
dt
(t) = h (∆iu˜, θ, i) + ρ ≥ h (0, θ, i) + ρ ,
because if ∆ip ≥ 0 we have
h(∆ip, θ, i) ≥ h(0, θ, i),
since α∗ ≥ 0. Furthermore, if we take M < ρ < 2M we get
−
du˜i
dt
(t) > 0.
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This shows that the minimum of u˜ is achieved at T hence
ui(t) ≥ −‖u(T )‖ − 2M(T − t).
Similarly, let (i, t) be a maximum point of u˜ on Id × [0, T ]. In this case we have ∆iu˜ ≤ 0.
Hence
−
du˜i
dt
(t) = h (∆iu˜, θ, i) + ρ ≤ h (0, θ, i) + ρ .
Furthermore, if we take −2M < ρ < −M we get
−
du˜i
dt
(t) < 0.
This shows that the maximum of u˜ is achieved at T hence
ui(t) ≤ ‖u(T )‖+ 2M(T − t).
As a consequence of the last Proposition (and also using that h is Lipschitz), Picard Theorem
allow us to state
Proposition 3. The terminal value problem (TVP) given by (8) has an unique solution.
Now we prove a verification Theorem:
Theorem 1. Suppose u : Id × [0, T ] → R is a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi terminal value
problem (8). Then u is the value function associated to the distribution θ, and
α˜(i, s) ≡ α∗(∆iu(s), θ(s), i)
is an optimal Markovian control.
Proof. The main tool for proving Theorem 1 is the Dynkin Formula (see [Kol11], for instance):
suppose α is a Markovian control continuous in time. Define the infinitesimal generator of the
process is by
(Aαϕ)i(s) =
∑
j
αij(s)[ϕ
j(s)− ϕi(s)] . (9)
We have that, for any function ϕ : Id × [0,+∞)→ R, C
1 in the last variable, and any t < T ,
E
α
it=i
[
ϕiT (T )− ϕi(t)
]
= Eα
it=i
[∫ T
t
dϕis
dt
(s) + (Aαϕ)is(s)ds
]
, (10)
where the superscript α means that is is driven by the the control α, while the subscript it = i
means we are considering the expectation conditioned on it = i. We call (10) the Dynkin’s formula
in analogy to the Dynkin’s formula in stochastic calculus.
Now to prove the Theorem we make ϕ = u in (10) . Using the terminal condition ui(T ) =
ψi (θ(T )) we have that, for any control α,
E
α
it=i
[
ψiT (θ(T ))− ui(t)
]
= Eα
it=i
[∫ T
t
duis
dt
(s) + (Aαu)is(s)ds
]
. (11)
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Now let α be any control. In the next steps we will use the definition of uiθ(t, α), given in (3), and
then (11), (9), and (4) to have
uiθ(t, α) = E
α
it=i
[
ψiT (θ(T )) +
∫ T
t
c(is, θ(s), α(s))ds
]
= ui(t) + Eα
it=i
[∫ T
t
duis
dt
(s) + (Aαu)is(s) + c(is, θ(s), α(s))ds
]
≥ ui(t) + Eα
it=i

∫ T
t
duis
dt
(s) + min
µ∈(R+
0
)d
∑
j
µj [u
j(s)− uis(s)] + c(is, θ(s), µ)


= ui(t) + Eαit=i
[∫ T
t
duis
dt
(s) + h(∆iu(s), θ(s), is)ds
]
= ui(t) ,
where the last equation holds because u is a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (8). Note
that in the particular case where α is given by the specific control α˜(i, s) = α∗(∆ius, θs, i), we
have equality in the all the steps above, and therefore we have uiθ(t, α˜) = u
i(t) which show us that
α˜ is the optimal control and that the objective function uiθ(t) is indeed given by u
i(t).
2.6 Mean field Nash equilibria
The mean field Nash equilibrium occurs when the background players are using a strategy β for
which the best response of the reference player is β itself, more precisely when the transition rate
from j to i at time s is given by
βji(s) = α
∗
i (∆ju(s), θ(s), j).
The Nash equilibrium is then characterized by the system of Kolmogorov and Hamilton-Jacobi
equations {
d
dt
θi =
∑
j θ
jα∗i (∆ju, θ, j)
− d
dt
ui = h(∆iu, θ, i),
(12)
together with the initial-terminal conditions
θ(0) = θ0 u
i(T ) = ψi(θ(T )). (13)
Note that from the ODE point of view this problem is somewhat non-standard as some of the
variables have initial conditions whereas other variables have prescribed terminal data. We call
this problem the initial-terminal value problem (ITVP) for the mean field game, and a solution
of such ITVP is what we call a solution to the MFG given by T, θ0, c, ψ.
2.7 Existence of Nash Equilibria in the MFG
We now address the existence of solutions to (12) satisfying the initial-terminal conditions (13).
The proof of existence will be based upon a fixed point argument.
Proposition 4. There exists a solution to (12) satisfying the initial-terminal conditions (13).
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Proof. Let F be the set of continuous functions defined on [0, T ] and taking values in Sd, with the
C0 norm. Consider the function ξ : F → F that is obtained in the following way: given θ ∈ F ,
let uθ be the solution of terminal value problem given by the Hamilton-Jacobi equations (8){
− du
i
dt
= h(∆iu, θ, i),
ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )).
(14)
We know uθ depends continuously on the parameters θ.
Now get the optimal control βθ given by the Verification Theorem (Theorem 1):
βθ(i, t) = argminµ∈(R+
0
)dc(i, θ, µ) + µ ·∆iuθ = α
∗(∆iuθ, θ, i) . (15)
We use Proposition 1 to conclude that βθ is a continuous function of uθ, and therefore of θ.
Finally, then let ξ(θ) be the solution to the Kolmogorov equation (1) given by the initial value
problem:
dθi
dt
=
∑
j
θjβθji ; θ(0) = θ0 . (16)
Such solution ξ(θ) depends continuously on the parameters βθ, and therefore on θ.
Therefore, using standard ODE theory we just proved that ξ is a continuous function from F
to F .
Now, using Proposition 2, we see from (15) that β is bounded, with bounds that do not depend
on θ, and therefore from (16) we have that ξ(θ) is Lipschitz, with Lipschitz constant Λ independent
of θ.
Now consider the set C of all Lipschitz continuous function in F with Lipschitz constant
bounded by Λ. This is a set of uniformly bounded and equicontinuous functions. Thus, by Arzela-
Ascoli, it is a relatively compact set. It is also clear that it is a convex set. Hence, by Brouwer
fixed point Theorem, ξ has a fixed point in C.
2.8 The monotonicity hypothesis
In order to prove the uniqueness of the MFG (§2.10), and also consider the convergence of solu-
tions of MFG to stationary solutions (when T → ∞ - see §2.13 ) we need to introduce several
monotonicity hypothesis as in the original works by Lions and Lasry. We start with a definition:
Definition 1. Let v ∈ Rd, and set 1 = (1, ..., 1) ∈ Rd. In Rd/R we define the norm
‖v‖♯ = inf
λ∈R
‖v + λ1‖.
Observe that
∆iu = ∆iv ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ d ⇔ ∃ c ∈ R such that u = v + c1 ⇔ ‖u− v‖♯ = 0 .
Furthermore we have
‖u‖♯ =
maxi(u
i)−mini(u
i)
2
.
Assumption 1. We suppose the following monotonicity hypothesis on ψ:∑
i
(θi − θ˜i)(ψi(θ) − ψi(θ˜)) ≥ 0 (17)
The previous assumption holds, for instance, if ψ is the gradient of a convex function.
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Assumption 2. We suppose that for every M , on the set ‖z‖♯ ≤M the function ∆iz → h(∆iz)
is uniformly concave in the non-degenerate directions, i.e., there exists γi > 0 such that
h(∆iz, θ, i)− h(∆iw, θ, i) − α
∗(∆iw, θ, i) · (∆iz −∆iw) ≤ −γi‖∆iz −∆iw‖2. (18)
Assumption 3. We also suppose that h satisfies the following monotonicity property:
θ · (h(z, θ˜)− h(z, θ)) + θ˜ · (h(z˜, θ)− h(z˜, θ˜)) ≤ −γ‖θ− θ˜‖2, (19)
where h(z, θ) := (h(∆1z, θ, 1), ..., h(∆dz, θ, d)), and γ > 0.
The last three hypothesis will be satisfied if h can be written as
h(∆iz, θ, i) = h˜(∆iz, i) + f
i(θ),
with h˜ (locally) uniformly concave in the sense of (18) and f satisfying the monotonicity hypothesis
(f(θ˜)− f(θ)) · (θ − θ˜) ≤ −γ|θ − θ˜|2.
The previous property holds, for instance, if f is the gradient of a convex function f(θ) = ∇Φ(θ).
2.9 A key estimate
The monotonicity hypothesis from the previous section can be used to establish both uniqueness
of equilibrium solutions, §2.10, and a trend to equilibrium type result §2.13. For convenience,
rather than considering the initial terminal value problem with initial values for θ at t = 0 we
consider the problem with initial values at t = −T . This will be convenient when studying the
trend to equilibrium, which corresponds to send T →∞ and analyzing the behavior of (θ0, u0).
Lemma 1. Fix T > 0 and suppose that (θ, u) and (θ˜, u˜) are solutions of (12) with initial-terminal
conditions θ(−T ) = θ−T , ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )) and θ˜(−T ) = θ˜−T , u˜i(T ) = ψi(θ˜(T )). Assume further
that ‖u‖♯, ‖u˜‖♯ ≤ C. Then there exists a constant C independent of T such that, for all 0 < M < T ,
we have∫ M
−M
‖(θ − θ˜)(s)‖2 + ‖(u− u˜)(s)‖2♯ds
≤ C
(
‖(θ − θ˜)(M)‖2 + ‖(u− u˜)(M)‖2♯ + ‖(θ − θ˜)(−M)‖
2 + ‖(u− u˜)(−M)‖2♯
)
.
Proof. Observe that
d
dt
[
(θ − θ˜) · (u − u˜)
]
=
d∑
i=1
[
(θ˙i − ˙˜θi)(ui − u˜i) + (θi − θ˜i)(u˙i − ˙˜ui)
]
=
d∑
i=1
[
(ui − u˜i)
(∑
j
θjα∗i (∆ju, θ, j)−
∑
j
θ˜jα∗i (∆j u˜, θ˜, j)
)
+ (θi − θ˜i)(h(∆iu˜, θ˜, i)− h(∆iu, θ, i))
]
.
In order to use the hypothesis (18) and (19) we sum and subtract some terms and we change the
names of the variables in the double sums.
d
dt
[
(θ − θ˜) · (u− u˜)
]
=
d∑
i=1
θi[h(∆iu˜, θ˜, i)− h(∆iu˜, θ, i)] + θ˜
i[h(∆iu, θ, i)− h(∆iu, θ˜, i)]
+
d∑
i=1
θi[h(∆iu˜, θ, i)− h(∆iu, θ, i)] +
d∑
j=1
d∑
i=1
θiα∗j (∆iu, θ, i)(u
j − u˜j)
+
d∑
i=1
θ˜i[h(∆iu, θ˜, i)− h(∆iu˜, θ˜, i)] +
d∑
i=j
d∑
i=1
θ˜iα∗j (∆iu˜, θ˜, i)(u˜
j − uj).
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Now using that (u˜i − ui)
∑
j
α∗j (∆iu, θ, i) = 0 and remembering that
d∑
j=1
α∗j (∆iu, θ, i)(u
j − u˜j) =
α∗(∆iu, θ, i) · (u˜− u), we have
d
dt
[
(θ − θ˜) · (u − u˜)
]
=
d∑
i=1
θi[h(∆iu, θ˜, i)− h(∆iu, θ, i)] + θ˜
i[h(∆iu˜, θ, i)− h(∆iu˜, θ˜, i)]
+
d∑
i=1
θi
[
h(∆iu˜, θ, i)− h(∆iu, θ, i)− α
∗(∆iu, θ, i) · (∆iu˜−∆iu)
]
+
d∑
i=1
θ˜i
[
h(∆iu, θ˜, i)− h(∆iu˜, θ˜, i)− α
∗(∆iu˜, θ˜, i) · (∆iu−∆iu˜)
]
.
Now we can use (18) and (19) to get the following estimate
d
dt
[
(θ − θ˜) · (u − u˜)
]
≤ −γ‖θ− θ˜‖2 −
d∑
i=1
(θi + θ˜i)γi‖∆iu−∆iu˜‖
2. (20)
Integrating (20) between −M and M , for 0 < M < T , we obtain
((θ− θ˜) · (u− u˜))(M)− ((θ− θ˜) · (u− u˜))(−M) ≤
∫ M
−M
−γ‖θ− θ˜‖2−
d∑
i=1
(θi + θ˜i)γi‖∆iu−∆iu˜‖
2.
Note that (θ − θ˜) · c1 = 0. Also for each t there exists ct ∈ R such that ‖(u − u˜)(t) + ct1‖ =
‖(u− u˜)(t)‖♯. Hence∫ M
−M
γ‖θ − θ˜‖2 +
d∑
i=1
(θi + θ˜i)γi‖∆iu−∆iu˜‖
2
≤ ((θ − θ˜) · (u − u˜+ c−M1))(−M) + ((θ − θ˜) · (u˜ − u+ cM1))(M)
≤
1
2
‖(θ − θ˜)(M)‖2 +
1
2
‖(u− u˜)(M)‖2♯ +
1
2
‖(θ − θ˜)(−M)‖2 +
1
2
‖(u− u˜)(−M)‖2♯ .
Using that ‖∆iu−∆iu˜‖ = ‖u− u˜− (u
i − u˜i)1‖ ≥ inf
λ
‖u− u˜+ λ1‖ = ‖u− u˜‖♯, we have
∫ M
−M
γ‖(θ − θ˜)(s)‖2 + γ¯‖(u− u˜)(s)‖2♯ds ≤
∫ M
−M
γ‖θ − θ˜‖2 +
d∑
i=1
(θi + θ˜i)γi‖∆iu−∆iu˜‖
2
≤
1
2
(
‖(θ − θ˜)(M)‖2 + ‖(u− u˜)(M)‖2♯ + ‖(θ − θ˜)(−M)‖
2 + ‖(u− u˜)(−M)‖2♯
)
.
Therefore we have proved∫ M
−M
‖(θ − θ˜)(s)‖2 + ‖(u− u˜)(s)‖2♯ds (21)
≤
1
2γ˜
(
‖(θ − θ˜)(M)‖2 + ‖(u− u˜)(M)‖2♯ + ‖(θ − θ˜)(−M)‖
2 + ‖(u− u˜)(−M)‖2♯
)
.
Lemma 2. Fix T > 0. Suppose that (θ, u) and (θ˜, u˜) are solutions of (12) with initial-terminal
conditions θ(−T ) = θ0, u
i(T ) = ψi(θ(T )) and θ˜(−T ) = θ˜0, u˜
i(T ) = ψ˜i(θ˜(T )). Then∫ T
−T
‖(θ − θ˜)(s)‖2 + ‖(u− u˜)(s)‖2♯ds ≤ KT
3 + 4T. (22)
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Proof. Note that ‖(θ− θ˜)(s)‖ ≤ 2. Let K0 = ‖ψ − ψ˜‖C0 . For each −T < s < T , by the definition
of u and u˜ we have
ui(s) = min
α
E
α
is=i
[∫ T
s
c(it, θt, αt)dt+ ψ
iT (θT )
]
= Eα¯
is=i
[∫ T
s
c(it, θt, α¯t)dt+ ψ
iT (θT )
]
and
u˜i(s) ≤ Eα¯is=i
[∫ T
s
c(it, θ˜t, α¯t)dt+ ψ˜
iT (θ˜T )
]
.
Hence
u˜i(s)− ui(s) ≤ Eα¯is=i
[∫ T
s
(
c(it, θ˜t, α¯t)− c(it, θt, α¯t)
)
dt+ (ψ˜iT (θ˜T )− ψ
iT (θT ))
]
.
By the Lipschitz continuity of c and ψ in θ (remember that the Lipschitz continuity of c is uniform
in α), we have
u˜i(s)− ui(s) ≤ 2TK1 +K0.
Changing the roles of u and u˜ we get
‖u˜(s)− u(s)‖2♯ ≤ KT
2 +K.
Thus ∫ T
−T
‖(θ − θ˜)(s)‖2 + ‖(u− u˜)(s)‖2♯ds ≤ KT
3 + (4 + 2K)T.
2.10 Uniqueness of equilibria for the initial-terminal value problem
The first consequence of the monotonicity hypothesis is the uniqueness of equilibrium solutions
for the initial-terminal value problem, which is a simple application of Lions-Lasry monotonicity
method.
Theorem 2. Suppose the monotonicity assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then the system (12) and
(13) has a unique solution (θ, u).
Proof. Suppose (θ, u) and (θ˜, u˜) are solutions of (12) and (13). At the initial point t = 0 we have
that (θ − θ˜) · (u − u˜) = 0, because θ0 = θ˜0.
Integrating (20) between 0 and T , and using the terminal conditions, we have that
(θ(T )− θ˜(T )) · (ψ(θ(T ))− ψ(θ˜(T ))) ≤
∫ T
0
−γ‖θ− θ˜‖2 −
d∑
i=1
(θi + θ˜i)γi‖∆iu−∆iu˜‖
2,
now, by assumption 1 we get
0 ≤
∫ T
0
−γ‖θ− θ˜‖2 −
d∑
i=1
(θi + θ˜i)γi‖∆iu−∆iu˜‖
2,
which implies that θ(s) = θ˜(s) for all s ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, we have the uniqueness for θ. Then,
once θ is known to be unique, we obtain by a standard ODE argument that u = u˜.
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2.11 Contractive mean field games
We now introduce a condition that allow us to establish existence of stationary solutions as well
as a-priori bounds for the initial-terminal value problem.
Definition 2. Let 〈u〉 =
1
d
∑
j
uj . We say that h : Rd×Sd × Id → R is contractive if there exists
M > 0 such that, ∀θ, ∀i, if ‖u‖♯ > M , then
(∆iu)
j
≤ 0 ∀ j implies h(∆iu, θ, i)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉 < 0 , (23)
and
(∆iu)
j
≥ 0 ∀ j implies h(∆iu, θ, i)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉 > 0 . (24)
Conditions (23) and (24) are natural if one observes that
(∆i1u)
j ≤ 0 ∀j and (∆i2u)
j ≥ 0 ∀j
implies
2‖u‖♯ = u
i1 − ui2 .
So, if u is a smooth solution to (12) and ‖u(t)‖♯ is differentiable with ‖u(t)‖♯ > M then
d
dt
‖u‖♯ > 0 ,
which implies the flow is backwards contractive with respect to the ‖·‖♯ norm of the u component.
The contractivity condition can be verified explicitly in many examples as we will illustrate in
what follows. Consider the particular case
c(i, θ, α) =
∑
j
α2j
2
+ f i(θ) , (25)
where f i(θ) is continuous on θ ∈ Sd. We have in this case that
h(∆iu, θ, i) = f
i(θ)−
1
2
∑
j
[(ui − uj)+]2 . (26)
We will show now that h is contractive. Suppose first (∆iu)
j ≤ 0 ∀j. As all other cases are similar
we assume i = 1 and
u1 ≥ u2 ≥ ... ≥ ud . (27)
Therefore
h(∆1u, θ, 1)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉 =
d− 1
d

−1
2
∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2


+
1
2d
(∑
j>2
(u2 − uj)2 +
∑
j>3
(u3 − uj)2 + ...+ (ud−1 − ud)2
)
+ F1(θ)
where F1(θ) is a bounded function of θ, namely
‖F1(θ)‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
d− 1
d
f1(θ) −
1
d
∑
j>1
f j(θ)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2maxθ,i f i(θ) . (28)
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Now we multiply by −2d to have
−2d (h(∆1u, θ, 1)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉) = (d− 1)

∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2


−
(∑
j>2
(u2 − uj)2 +
∑
j>3
(u3 − uj)2 + ...+ (ud−1 − ud)2
)
− 2dF1(θ) .
Reordering we have
− 2d (h(∆1u, θ, 1)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉)
=
∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2 +
(∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2 −
∑
j>2
(u2 − uj)2
)
+
(∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2 −
∑
j>3
(u3 − uj)2
)
+ ...+
(∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2 − (ud−1 − ud)2
)
− 2dF1(θ) .
Now using (27) we have an inequality
− 2d (h(∆1u, θ, 1)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉)
≥
∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2 +
(∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2 −
∑
j>2
(u1 − uj)2
)
+
(∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2 −
∑
j>3
(u1 − uj)2
)
+ ...+
(∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2 − (u1 − ud)2
)
− 2dF1(θ) ,
which implies
− 2d (h(∆1u, θ, 1)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉)
≥
∑
j>1
(u1 − uj)2 +
(
(u1 − u2)2
)
+
(
(u1 − u2)2 + (u1 − u3)2
)
+ ...+
( d−1∑
j=1
(u1 − uj)2
)
− 2dF1(θ) ,
and the last inequality implies that h(∆1u, θ, 1)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉 < 0 whenever ‖u‖♯ is large enough.
For the case (∆iu)
j
≥ 0 ∀j it suffices, as before, to assume i = 1 and
u1 ≤ u2 ≤ ... ≤ ud.
Then
h(∆1u, θ, 1)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉
=
1
2d
(∑
j<2
(u2 − uj)2 +
∑
j<3
(u3 − uj)2 + ...+
∑
j<d
(ud − uj)2
)
+ F1(θ).
This implies
h(∆1u, θ, 1)− 〈h(u, θ, ·)〉 > 0 ,
whenever ‖u‖♯ is large enough.
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2.12 Stationary solutions
We now discuss stationary solutions to (12). It is clear, if, for instance h > 0 the equation (12)
cannot admit stationary solutions in the sense that d
dt
u = d
dt
θ = 0. Therefore we need to consider
stationary solutions to (12) modulo addition of a constant:
Definition 3. A triplet (θ¯, u¯, κ) ∈ Sd × Rd × R is called a stationary solution of (12) if{∑
j θ¯
jα∗i (∆j u¯, θ¯, j) = 0 ,
h(∆iu¯, θ¯, i) = κ .
(29)
If (θ¯, u¯, κ) is a stationary solution for the MFG equations, then (θ¯, u¯− κt) solves (12).
Proposition 5. Suppose h : Rd × Sd × Id → R given by (4) is contractive.
(a) For M large enough, the set
{
u ∈ Rd, ‖u‖♯ < M
}
×Sd is invariant backwards in time by the
flow of equation (12).
(b) There exist a stationary solution of (12).
Proof. The first item is a direct consequence of the definition 2 and the observations thereafter.
The second item is a consequence of Brower fixed point theorem for flows that leave invariant
compact and convex sets.
2.13 Uniqueness of stationary solutions and trend to equilibrium
We now discuss two important consequences of the monotonicity and contractivity properties: the
uniqueness of solutions and the trend to equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the monotonicity assumptions 2, 3, and contractivity hold.
(a) Suppose ‖u(T )‖♯ ≤M , where u is a solution to (12), and M is large enough. Then ‖u(t)‖♯ ≤
M ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
(b) The stationary solution (θ¯, u¯, κ) is unique (up to the addition of a constant to u¯).
(c) Given T > 0, a vector θ0, and a terminal condition ψ, let (θ
T , uT ) be the solution of (12)
with initial-terminal conditions θT (−T ) = θ0 and u
T,i(T ) = ψi(θT (T )). We have, when
T →∞
θT (0)→ θ¯, ‖uT (0)− u¯‖♯ → 0,
where (θ¯, u¯) is the unique stationary solution for the MFG equations.
Proof. Item (a) is again a a direct consequence of the definition 2 and the observations thereafter.
In order to prove items (b) and (c), fix two probability distributions θ0 and θ˜0 in S
d, and
two terminal conditions ψ and ψ˜. For each T > 0, let (θT , uT ) and (θ˜T , u˜T ) be the solu-
tions of (12) with initial-terminal conditions θT (−T ) = θ0, u
T,i(T ) = ψi(θT (T )) and θ˜T (−T ) =
θ˜0, u˜
T,i(T ) = ψ˜i(θ˜T (T )), respectively. By the contractivity hypothesis, ‖u(t)‖♯ and ‖u˜(t)‖♯ are
uniformly bounded.
We define
fT (s) := ‖(θ
T − θ˜T )(s)‖2 + ‖(uT − u˜T )(s)‖2♯ ,
and, for 0 < τ < T ,
FT (τ) :=
∫ τ
−τ
fT (s)ds.
By (21), we have
FT (τ) ≤
1
γ˜
(fT (τ) + fT (−τ)).
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Note that F˙T (τ) = fT (τ) + fT (−τ), hence
FT (τ) ≤
1
γ˜
F˙T (τ).
This implies d
dt
lnFT (τ) ≥ γ˜, therefore
lnFT (τ) − lnFT (1) ≥ (τ − 1)γ˜,
for all 0 < τ < T . From this we get∫ 1
−1
fT (s)ds = FT (1) ≤
FT (T )
e(T−1)γ˜
→ 0 when T →∞,
because F has sub-exponential growth, by (22) in Lemma 2.
Now there exists t(T ) ∈ [−1, 1] with fT (t(T )) ≤
FT (1)
2 . Hence
‖θT (t(T ))− θ˜T (t(T ))‖ → 0, ‖uT (t(T ))− u˜T (t(T ))‖♯ → 0 ,
as T → +∞.
Recall that (θT , uT ) and (θ˜T , u˜T ) are solutions of the same time-homogeneous ODE (12), with
data at time tT (θ
T (tT ), u
T (tT )) and (θ˜
T (tT ), u˜
T (tT )) whose difference goes to zero as as T → +∞.
From the continuous dependence of solutions of ODE´s with respect to initial conditions, and
observing that tT ∈ [−1, 1], we can conclude that
‖θT (t)− θ˜T (t)‖ → 0 and ‖uT (t)− u˜T (t)‖♯ → 0 , uniformly in t ∈ [−1, 1] , as T →∞.
Now, from Theorem 5, we know there exists a stationary solution (θ¯, u¯). If we choose initial
and terminal conditions (θ˜, ψ˜) in such a way that (θ˜T (t), u˜T (t)) = (θ¯, κ(T − t) + u¯), we have the
convergence of (θT , uT ) to (θ¯, u¯), which implies both the trend to equilibrium and the uniqueness
of stationary solutions.
3 The N + 1-player game
In this section we consider games between N +1-players which are symmetric under permutation
of players. As in the previous section we assume that each of the players can be in one of d states,
and knows, in addition to his or her state, the number of players in each of the states.
Players follow a Markovian dynamics in which each player controls the switching rate, as dis-
cussed in §3.1, and §3.2. Using Hamilton-Jacobi ODE methods, §3.3, and a verification Theorem,
§3.4, we formulate the Nash equilibrium problem for the N + 1-player problem. Maximum prin-
ciple type estimates are considered in §3.3 which are then applied to establishing the existence of
Nash equilibrium solutions in §3.5.
3.1 Controlled Markov Dynamics
Remember that Id = {1, 2, 3, ..., d}, and let S
d
N = {(n
1, ..., nd) ∈ Zd‖
∑d
i=1 n
i = N,ni ≥ 0}. Let
ek be the k − th vector of the canonical basis of R
d, and let ejk = ej − ek.
In the preceding section we considered a game where a very large number of players was
allowed to switch between d states. The fraction of players in each state was approximated by a
deterministic vector θ(t). In an analogous way, we consider now a game between N + 1 players
that are allowed to switch between the same d states. As before, to describe the game we will use
a reference player. However, we no longer make the assumption that the fraction of the players in
each state can be approximated by a deterministic vector θ(t). Instead, in addition to the position
it of the reference player, we consider a second controlled Markov Chain n, taking values in S
d
N ,
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which records the number of the remaining players (distinct from the reference player) that are
in any of the d states at any given time. Each player knows his own state, as well as the number
of remaining players that are in any of the states. No further information is available to any
individual player.
We suppose the reference player switches from state i to state j according to a switching
Markovian rate αij(n, t) which he or she would like to optimize upon. We suppose that each of
the players distinct from the reference player follows a controlled Markov process kt with transition
rates from state k to state j given by β = βkj(n, t). More precisely, we have, for j 6= k,
P
(
kt+h = j‖nt = n,kt = k
)
= βkj(n, t).h+ o(h) ,
where lim o(h)
h
= 0 when h → 0. We suppose that β : Id × Id × S
d
N × [0,+∞) → R is an
admissible control, that it is bounded and continuous as a function of time, and βkk(n, t) =
−
∑
j 6=k βkj(n, t) ∀ k, n, t and βkj(n, t) ≥ 0 ∀ k 6= j. We assume further that the state transitions
of the different players are independent, conditioned on i and n.
From the symmetry and independence of transitions assumption, for k 6= j, we have
P
(
nt+h = n+ ejk‖nt = n, it = i
)
= γn,iβ,kj(t).h+ o(h) ,
where lim o(h)
h
= 0 when h→ 0 and the transition rates of the process n are given by
γn,iβ,kj(t) = nkβkj(n+ eik, t). (30)
The previous expression for the rate, namely the term n+ eik instead of n, follows from the fact
that from the point of view of a player which is in state k, and is distinct from the reference player,
the number of other players in any state is given by n + ei − ek = n + eik. Note that the rate
function β is a deterministic time-dependent function, which makes (n, i) a non-time homogeneous
Markov process.
3.2 Individual player point of view
The reference player would like to choose its transition rate α, possibly different from β, in order
to minimize
uin(t, β, α) = E
β,α
At(i,n)
[∫ T
t
c
(
is,
ns
N
,α(s)
)
ds+ ψiT
(nT
N
)]
, (31)
where the subscript At(i, n) means we are considering the expectation conditioned on it = i,nt =
n. That is, reference player looks for the control α which is a solution to the minimization problem
uin(t;β) = inf
α
uin(t, β, α),
where the minimization is performed over the set of all admissible controls α. We will call the
function uin(t;β) above the value function for the reference player associated to the strategy β of
the remaining N players. The control α that attains the minimum above can be called the best
response (for the reference player) to a control β.
3.3 The Hamilton-Jacobi ODE for the N+1-player game
Fix an admissible control β. Consider the system of ODE´s indexed by i and n given by
−
dϕin
dt
(t) =
∑
k,j
γn,iβ,kj(t)
(
ϕin+ejk (t)− ϕ
i
n(t)
)
+ h
(
∆iϕn(t),
n
N
, i
)
, (32)
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where γβ is given by (30), and, as before, ∆iϕn(t) =
(
ϕ1n(t)− ϕ
i
n(t), . . . , ϕ
d
n(t)− ϕ
i
n(t)
)
.
This system of ODE is called the Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) ODE for the N + 1-player game
associated to the strategy β of the remaining N players.
We denote by
‖u(t)‖∞ = max
n,i
|uin(t)|, (33)
The proof of the next Proposition is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 and it is postponed
to the Appendix.
Proposition 6. Let u be a solution to (32) and M = max
(i,θ)∈Id×Sd
|h(0, θ, i)|. Then for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T
we have
‖u(t)‖∞ ≤ ‖u(T )‖∞ + 2M(T − t).
As a consequence of h being locally Lipschitz continuous, Picard Theorem, together with the
previous bound, allow us to establish
Theorem 4. The terminal value problem (TVP) given by equation (32) and the terminal condition
ϕin(T ) = ψ
i( n
N
) has a unique solution.
3.4 A verification Theorem for the N+1-player game
Now we state a verification Theorem, which is completely analogous to the respective verification
Theorem of the preceding section: The corresponding proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 5. Let v be a solution to (32) satisfying the terminal condition vin(T ) = ψ
i
(
n
N
)
. Then
uin(t;β) = v
i
n(t) .
Also, the Markovian control
α˜(β)(i, n, t) ≡ α∗
(
∆ivn(t),
n
N
, i
)
, (34)
is admissible and satisfies
uin(t;β) = u
i
n(t, β, α˜(β)) .
Thus a classical solution to the HJ equation associated to β is the value function corresponding
to β and determines an optimal admissible control α˜(β), for the reference player.
3.5 Equilibrium solutions
We now consider Nash equilibria for the N + 1-player game. For that we look for controls β for
which the best response of any player to β is β itself.
Definition 4. An admissible control β is a Nash equilibrium if α˜(β) = β.
Theorem 6. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium β¯.
Proof. A necessary condition for a control β¯ to be a Nash equilibrium is that from (34), we have
β¯kj(n, t) = α
∗
j
(
∆kun(t; β¯),
n
N
, k
)
.
Hence this gives rise to the system of nonlinear differential equations
−
duin
dt
=
∑
k,j
γn,ikj (u
i
n+ejk − u
i
n) + h
(
∆iun,
n
N
, i
)
, (35)
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with terminal condition
uin(T ) = ψ
i
( n
N
)
∀ i ∈ Id, n ∈ S
d
N , (36)
where γn,ikj are given by
γn,ikj = nkα
∗
j
(
∆kun+eik ,
n+ eik
N
, k
)
. (37)
Note that (35) is well posed because un is bounded and the right-hand side is Lipschitz and admits
a unique solution. Hence existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium follows.
The following property of γn,ikj will be proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 3. Let us suppose that ‖∆kun‖∞ is bounded, and denote by zln,sr = u
l
n+ers − u
l
n. Then
we have ∣∣∣γn+ers,ikj − γn,ikj ∣∣∣ ≤ C + CN maxrs ‖z··,sr‖∞. (38)
4 Convergence
This last section addresses the convergence as the number of players tends to infinity to the mean
field model derived in the previous section.
We start this section by discussing some preliminary estimates in §4.1. Then, in §4.2 we
establish uniform estimates for |un+ers−un|, which are essential to prove our main result, Theorem
7, which is discussed in §4.3. This theorem shows that the model derived in the previous section
can be obtained as an appropriate limit of the model with N + 1 players discussed in section 3.
4.1 Preliminary results
Let us denote by m = (i, n) ∈ Id ×S
d
N , and consider the system of ordinary differential equations
−z˙in =
∑
k,j
ain,kj
(
zin+ejk − z
i
n
)
+
∑
l
al,in (z
l
n − z
i
n),
where ain,kj ≥ 0 and a
l,i
n ≥ 0. Note that this system is a particular case of
− z˙m =
∑
m′∈Id×SdN
amm′(t)(zm′ − zm), (39)
where amm′(t) ≥ 0. We write (39) in compact form as
− z˙(t) = M(t)z(t). (40)
The solution to this equation with terminal data z(T ) can be written as
z(t) = K(t, T )z(T ), (41)
where K(t, T ) is the fundamental solution to (40) with K(T, T ) = I. Note that equations (40)
and (41) imply
d
dt
K(t, T ) = −M(t)K(t, T ). (42)
The proofs of Lemma 4, Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 can be found in Appendix.
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Lemma 4. For t < T we have
‖z(t)‖∞ ≤ ‖z(T )‖∞
(see (33)). Furthermore, if z(T ) ≤ 0 then z(t) ≤ 0.
From the previous Lemma we also conclude
Lemma 5. If p1 ≤ p2, and t ≤ s, then we have
K(t, s)p1 ≤ K(t, s)p2,
which means K(t, s) is an order preserving operator.
Proof. Observe that if p1 − p2 ≤ 0 then K(t, s)(p1 − p2) ≤ 0, by Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. Suppose z is a solution to
− z˙(s) ≤M(s)z(s) + f(z(s)). (43)
where M(t) was defined in (39) and (40). Then, for all m = (i, n) ∈ Id × S
d
N
zin(t) = zm(t) ≤ ‖z(T )‖∞ +
∫ T
t
‖f(z(s))‖∞ds.
Lemma 7. Suppose v : [0, T ]→ R is a solution to the ODE with terminal condition{
− dv
ds
= Cv + CNv2 + C
N
,
v(T ) ≤ C
N
,
(44)
where N is a natural number, and C > 0. Then, there exists T ⋆ > 0, which does not depend on
N , such that T ≤ T ⋆ implies v(s) ≤ 2C
N
for all 0 ≤ s ≤ T .
4.2 Gradient estimates
In this section we prove ”gradient estimates” for the N + 1-player game, that is, we assume that
the difference un+ers − un is of the order
1
N
at time T and show that it remains so for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
as long as T is sufficiently small.
Proposition 7. Let uin(t) be a solution of (35) with terminal conditions (36). Then there exists
C > 0 and T ⋆ > 0 such that, for 0 < T < T ⋆, we have
max
rs
‖uin+ers(t)− u
i
n(t)‖∞ ≤
2C
N
,
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Before proving the Proposition, we remember the norm ‖ · ‖∞ was defined in (33).
Proof. Using the terminal condition (36) and remembering that ψ is Lipschitz continuous, we
know that there is a constant C > 0 such that
max
rs
‖uin+ers(T )− u
i
n(T )‖∞ ≤
C
N
. (45)
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Let zin,sr = u
i
n+ers − u
i
n. We have
−z˙in,sr =
∑
k,j
[
γn+ers,ikj
(
uin+ers+ejk − u
i
n+ers
)
− γn,ikj
(
uin+ejk − u
i
n
)]
+h
(
∆iun+ers ,
n+ ers
N
, i
)
− h
(
∆iun,
n
N
, i
)
=
∑
k,j
[
γn+ers,ikj z
i
n+ers,kj − γ
n,i
kj z
i
n,kj
]
+ h
(
∆iun+ers ,
n+ ers
N
, i
)
− h
(
∆iun,
n
N
, i
)
=
∑
k,j
[(
γn+ers,ikj + γ
n,i
kj
2
)(
zin+ers,kj − z
i
n,kj
)]
+
∑
k,j
[(
γn+ers,ikj − γ
n,i
kj
2
)(
zin+ers,kj + z
i
n,kj
)]
+h
(
∆iun+ers ,
n+ ers
N
, i
)
− h
(
∆iun,
n
N
, i
)
.
Note that zin+ers,kj − z
i
n,kj = u
i
n+ers+ejk − u
i
n+ers − u
i
n+ejk + u
i
n = z
i
n+ejk ,sr − z
i
n,sr.
From Lemma 3, we have
∣∣∣∣∣
(
γn+ers,ikj − γ
n,i
kj
2
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C + CN maxrs ‖z··,sr‖∞. And note that
∑
k,j
(
zin+ers,kj + z
i
n,kj
)
≤ 2
∑
k,j
‖z··,kj‖∞ ≤ 2d
2max
k,j
‖z··,kj‖∞.
Hence
∑
k,j
[(
γn+ers,ikj − γ
n,i
kj
2
)(
zin+ers,kj + z
i
n,kj
)]
≤ Cmax
rs
‖z··,kj‖∞ + CN max
rs
‖z··,kj‖
2
∞.
Using item (a) of Proposition 1 and also that zin,sr
∑
l
α∗l
(
un,
n
N
, i
)
= 0, we have
h
(
∆iun+ers ,
n+ ers
N
, i
)
− h
(
∆iun,
n
N
, i
)
= h
(
∆iun+ers ,
n+ ers
N
, i
)
− h
(
∆iun+ers ,
n
N
, i
)
+ h
(
∆iun+ers ,
n
N
, i
)
− h
(
∆iun,
n
N
, i
)
≤
C
N
+
∑
l
α∗l
(
∆iun,
n
N
, i
) (
zln,sr − z
i
n,sr
)
.
Now denoting by ain,kj,sr =
γ
n+ers,i
kj
+γn,i
kj
2 , and a
l,i
n = α
∗
l
(
∆iun,
n
N
, i
)
, we get
−z˙in,sr ≤
∑
k,j
[
ain,kj,sr
(
zin+ejk,sr − z
i
n,sr
)]
+
∑
l
al,in (z
l
n,sr − z
i
n,sr) + f(z),
where f(z) =
C
N
+ Cmax
rs
‖z··,sr‖∞ + CN max
rs
‖z··,sr‖
2
∞.
At this point we are in position to apply Lemma 6 from the previous section. We obtain
zin,sr(t) ≤ ‖z
·
·,sr(T )‖∞ +
∫ T
t
Cmax
rs
‖z··,sr(s)‖∞ + CN max
rs
‖z··,sr(s)‖
2
∞ +
C
N
ds .
Finally, as zin,sr = u
i
n+ers − u
i
n, if we set w = max
rs
‖uin+ers − u
i
n‖∞ we conclude that
w(t) ≤ w(T ) +
∫ T
t
Cw(s) + CNw(s)2 +
C
N
ds.
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Now we define
η(t) = w(T ) +
∫ T
t
Cw(s) + CNw(s)2 +
C
N
ds.
We have that
w(t) ≤ η(t), (46)
and also that
dη
dt
(t) = −g(w(t)),
where g is the nondecreasing function g(w) = Cw + CNw2 + C
N
. Thus{
dη
dt
(t) ≥ −g(η(t)),
η(T ) = w(T ).
A standard argument from the basic theory of differential inequalities can now be used to prove
that η(t) ≤ v(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , if v(t) is the solution of{
dv
dt
(t) = −g(v(t)),
v(T ) = w(T ).
This last result can be combined with Lemma 7, the inequality (45) which means w(T ) ≤ C
N
and the inequality (46), to prove that w(t) ≤ 2C
N
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , which ends the proof of the
Proposition.
4.3 Convergence
In this section we prove Theorem 7, which implies the convergence of both distribution and value
function of the N + 1-player game to the mean field game, for small times.
Let θ0 = (θ
1
0 , θ
2
0 . . . , θ
d
0) ∈ S
d be given. We start by assuming that at the initial time the N
players distinct from the reference player are randomly assigned states 1, 2, . . . , d independently
according to the initial distribution θ0 (i.e. choosing state k with probability θ
k
0 ). Therefore, n0
is a random vector of Zd that follows a multinomial distribution with parameters N and θ0.
We will write nlt for the l-th coordinate of nt, which means the number of players (distinct
from the reference player) that are in state l at time t.
The norm we use for vectors of Rd, in this section, is the norm ‖v‖ = max{|v1|, |v2|, ..., |vd|},
where |vi| is the absolute value of the i-th coordinate of v.
The main result is the following:
Theorem 7. Let T ∗ be as in Proposition 7. There exists a constant C, independent of N , for
which, if T < T ∗, satisfies ρ = TC < 1, then
VN (t) +WN (t) ≤
C
1− ρ
1
N
,
for all t ∈ [0, T ], where
VN (t) ≡ E
[∥∥∥nt
N
− θ(t)
∥∥∥2] ,
and
WN (t) ≡ E
[∥∥u(t)− uN
nt
(t)
∥∥2] ,
where the pair θ(t) and u = u(t) is the solution of the MFG game (12), and uN = uN(t) is the
value function of the N + 1-player game, i.e., the solution of game (35).
22
Before proving Theorem 7 we need two Lemmas. Let

VN (l, t) ≡ E
[(
n
l
t
N
− θl(t)
)2]
,
WN (l, t) ≡ E
[(
ul(t)− uN,l
nt
(t)
)2]
.
(47)
We have
VN (t) = max{VN (1, t), . . . , VN (d, t)} and WN (t) = max{WN (1, t), . . . ,WN (d, t)}, (48)
and
VN (l, 0) = Var
[
nl0
N
]
=
θl0(1− θ
l
0)
N
, (49)
because nl0 is the sum of N independent and identically distributed random variables, each of
them having Bernoulli distribution with parameter θl0.
An important tool for proving Lemmas 8 and 9 is again the Dynkin Formula, now adapted to
the present situation: define the infinitesimal generator of the process (i,n) acting on a function
ϕ : Id × S
d
N × [0,+∞)→ R, C
1 in the last variable, by
Aαϕ(i, n, s) =
∑
j
αN,iij [ϕ(j, n, s)− ϕ(i, n, s)] +
∑
kj
nkαN,ikj [ϕ(i, n+ ejk, s)− ϕ(i, n, s)], (50)
where
αN,ikj = α
∗
j
(
∆ku
N
n+eik ,
n+ eik
N
, k
)
, (51)
is the transition rate from state k to state j in for equilibrium solutions of the N +1-player game,
as in section 3.5.
Then for any t < T ,
E [ϕ(iT ,nT , T )− ϕ(it,nt, t)] = E
[∫ T
t
dϕ
dt
(i,n, s) +Aαϕ(i,n, s)ds
]
. (52)
Note that in the right hand side of the equation above, the processes i and n are evaluated at
time s.
We will also denote by
αij = α
∗
j (∆iu, θ, i)
the transition rate from state i to state j in the equilibrium solutions of the mean field game as
in section 2.6.
Lemma 8. Let T ∗ be as in Proposition 7, and suppose T < T ∗. There exists C1 > 0 such that
VN (t) ≤
∫ t
0
C1(VN (s) +WN (s))ds+
C1
N
.
Proof. Using Dynkin’s Formula (52) with ϕl(i, n, s) =
(
nl
N
− θl(s)
)2
, and (49), we have
VN (l, t)−
θl0(1− θ
l
0)
N
= E
∫ t
0
(
ωN,l(s) + ςN,l(s)
)
ds ,
where
ςN,l(s) =
dϕl
dt
(i,n, s) = −2
(
nl
N
− θl
)∑
k
αklθ
k,
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and
ωN,l(s) =
∑
k
∑
j
nkαN,ikj
[
ϕl(n+ ejk, s)− ϕl(n, s)
]
.
Note that ϕl(i,n, s) just depend on n
l and s. Therefore ϕl(n+ ejk, s) = ϕl(n, s) if both j 6= l and
k 6= l. Hence
ωN,l(s) =
∑
k∈Id,j=l
nkαN,ikl
[
ϕl(n+ elk, s)− ϕl(n, s)
]
+
∑
j∈Id,k=l
nlαN,ilj
[
ϕl(n+ ejl, s)− ϕl(n, s)
]
=
∑
k 6=l
nkαN,ikl
[(
nl + 1
N
− θl
)2
−
(
nl
N
− θl
)2]
+
∑
j 6=l
nlαN,ilj
[(
nl − 1
N
− θl
)2
−
(
nl
N
− θl
)2]
=
(
2
(
nl
N
− θl
)
+
1
N
)∑
k 6=l
nk
N
αN,ikl +
(
2
(
−
nl
N
+ θl
)
+
1
N
)
nl
N
∑
j 6=l
αN,ilj
=
(
2
(
nl
N
− θl
)
+
1
N
)∑
k 6=l
nk
N
αN,ikl +
(
2
(
nl
N
− θl
)
−
1
N
)
nl
N
αN,ill
≤ 2
(
nl
N
− θl
)∑
k∈Id
nk
N
αN,ikl +
C˜
N
,
where in the inequality above we used the fact that αN,ikl is bounded (with bounds that do not
depend on N - here we are using that α∗ is Lipschitz and ∆iun is bounded - see Propositions 1
and 7). Now
ςN,l(s) + ωN,l(s) ≤2
(
nl
N
− θl
)∑
k
[
nk
N
αN,ikl − θ
kαkl
]
+
C˜
N
=2
(
nl
N
− θl
)∑
k
[
nk
N
αN,ikl −
nk
N
αkl +
nk
N
αkl − θ
kαkl
]
+
C˜
N
=2
(
nl
N
− θl
)∑
k
[
nk
N
(
αN,ikl − αkl
)
+ αkl
(
nk
N
− θk
)]
+
C˜
N
.
Then
VN (l, t) =E
∫ t
0
(
ωN,l(s) + ςN,l(s)
)
ds+
θl0(1 − θ
l
0)
N
≤E
∫ t
0
2
(
nl
N
− θl
)∑
k
nk
N
(
αN,ikl − αkl
)
ds
+E
∫ t
0
2
(
nl
N
− θl
)∑
k
αkl
(
nk
N
− θk
)
ds+
C˜T + 1/4
N
.
Now, using again the fact that α∗ is Lipschitz and
‖∆kw −∆kz‖ ≤ ‖w − z‖ , (53)
we see that
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|αN,ikl − αkl| =
∣∣∣∣α∗l
(
∆ku
N
n+eik ,
n+ eik
N
, k
)
− α∗l (∆ku, θ, k)
∣∣∣∣
≤ K
(∥∥∥∥θ − n+ eikN
∥∥∥∥+ ‖uNn+eik − u‖
)
≤ K
(∥∥∥θ − n
N
∥∥∥+ 2
N
+ ‖uNn+eik − u
N
n ‖+ ‖u
N
n − u‖
)
≤ K
(∥∥∥θ − n
N
∥∥∥+ 2 + 2C0
N
+ ‖uN
n
− u‖
)
,
where in the last equality we used the gradient estimates of Proposition 7.
Therefore
VN (l, t) ≤2K E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣nlN − θl
∣∣∣∣
( ∥∥∥θ − n
N
∥∥∥+ 2 + 2C0
N
+ ‖uN
n
− u‖
)
ds+
+E
∫ t
0
2
(
nl
N
− θl
)∑
k
αkl
(
nk
N
− θk
)
ds+
C˜T + 1/4
N
≤2K E
∫ t
0
∣∣∣∣nlN − θl
∣∣∣∣
( ∥∥∥θ − n
N
∥∥∥+ ‖uNn − u‖
)
ds+
+C3E
∫ t
0
2
∣∣∣∣nlN − θl
∣∣∣∣∑
k
∣∣∣∣nkN − θk
∣∣∣∣ds+ C4N
where we used the fact that αkl is bounded by a constant C3, and C4 = C˜T + 1/4 + 2T + 2C0T .
Now
VN (l, t) ≤2K E
∫ t
0
(∥∥∥θ − n
N
∥∥∥2 + ‖uNn − u‖ ∥∥∥θ − nN
∥∥∥)ds+
+2dC3E
∫ t
0
∥∥∥θ − n
N
∥∥∥2 ds+ C4
N
.
Finally using ab < a2 + b2 and (48), we have
VN (t) ≤
∫ t
0
C1(VN (s) +WN (s))ds+
C1
N
,
where C1 = 3max{2K, 2dC3, C4}.
Lemma 9. Let T ∗ be as in Proposition 7, and suppose T < T ∗. There exists C2 > 0 such that
WN (t) ≤
∫ T
t
C2(VN (s) +WN (s))ds+
C2
N
.
Proof. Using Dynkin formula (52) with ϕl(i, n, s) =
(
uN,ln (s) − u
l(s)
)2
, and equations (35) and
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(12), we have
WN (l, t)−WN (l, T ) = −E
[(
uN,l
n
(t)− ul(t)
)2]
+ E
[(
uN,l
n
(T )− ul(T )
)2]
=E
∫ T
t
2(uN,l
n
− ul)
d
ds
(uN,l
n
− ul)ds+ E
∫ T
t
∑
jk
nkαN,ikj
[
ϕl(i,n+ ejk, s)− ϕl(i,n, s)
]
ds
=E
∫ T
t
2(uN,l
n
− ul)

−∑
jk
nkαN,ikj
(
uN,l
n+ejk
− uN,l
n
)
− h
(
∆lu
N
n
,
n
N
, l
)
+ h(∆lu, θ, l)

ds
+ E
∫ T
t
∑
jk
nkαN,ikj
[(
uN,l
n+ejk
− ul
)2
−
(
uN,l
n
− ul
)2]
ds
=E
∫ T
t
∑
jk
nkαN,ikj
[
− 2
(
uN,l
n
− ul
)(
uN,l
n+ejk
− uN,l
n
)
+
(
uN,l
n+ejk
− ul
)2
−
(
uN,l
n
− ul
)2]
ds
+ E
∫ T
t
(
2(uN,l
n
− ul)
)(
h(∆lu, θ, l)− h
(
∆lu
N
n
,
n
N
, l
))
ds
=E
∫ T
t
∑
jk
nkαN,ikj
(
uN,l
n+ejk
− uN,l
n
)2
ds
+ E
∫ T
t
(
2(uN,ln − u
l)
)(
h(∆lu, θ, l)− h
(
∆lu
N
n ,
n
N
, l
))
ds.
In the last equation we used the fact that
−2
(
uN,ln − u
l
)(
uN,ln+ejk − u
N,l
n
)
+
(
uN,ln+ejk − u
l
)2
−
(
uN,ln − u
l
)2
=
(
uN,ln+ejk − u
N,l
n
)2
.
Now, using the gradient estimates from §4.2, Proposition 7, we have that
αN,ikj
(
uN,l
n+ejk
− uN,l
n
)2
<
K2
N2
,
which implies ∑
jk
nkαN,ikj
(
uN,l
n+ejk
− uN,ln
)2
<
dK2
N
.
For the same reason we have that WN (T ) is bounded by
K3
N
, which implies
WN (t) ≤
K4
N
+ 2E
∫ T
t
(
h(∆lu, θ, l)− h
(
∆lu
N
n ,
n
N
, l
)) (
uN,ln − u
l
)
ds .
Using the fact that h is Lipschitz in both variables, with Lipschitz constant uniform (since ∆u is
bounded) and (53) we see that
h(∆lu, θ, l)− h
(
∆lu
N
n
,
n
N
, l
)
< K
(∥∥∥θ − n
N
∥∥∥+ ‖uNn − u‖
)
.
Therefore, using uN,ln (s)− u
l(s) ≤ ‖uNn − u‖ and again ab < a
2 + b2, we have
WN (t) ≤
K4
N
+K5
∫ T
t
VN (s) +WN (s)ds ,
which ends the proof.
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Now we can prove our main result that establishes the convergence of the N + 1-player game
to the mean field model as N →∞.
Proof of Theorem 7:
Define C = C1 + C2. Adding both inequalities given in the two last Lemmas, we have
WN (t) + VN (t) ≤ C
∫ T
0
(VN (s) +WN (s))ds+
C
N
.
Now suppose ρ = TC < 1. Defining
WN + VN = max
0≤t≤T
WN (t) + VN (t),
we have
WN + VN ≤ ρ(WN + VN ) +
C
N
,
which proves the Theorem 7. 
5 Potential mean field games
An important class of examples are potential mean field games, which have additional structures
that can be used to deduct further properties. In these mean field games h has the form
h(z, θ, i) = h˜(z, i) + f i(θ) (54)
where h˜ : Rd × Id → R and f : R
d × Id → R is the gradient of a convex function. More precisely,
we suppose that there exists a convex function F : Rd → R such that ∇θF = f(·, θ).
5.1 Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations
Let H : R2d → R be given by
H(u, θ) =
∑
i
θih˜(∆iu, i) + F (θ) (55)
= θ · h˜(∆·u, ·) + F (θ) .
A direct computation shows that (12) can be written as

∂H
∂uj
= θ˙j ,
∂H
∂θj
= −u˙j.
(56)
This means the flow generated by equation (12) is Hamiltonian. In addition to the fact that the
Hamiltonian is preserved by the flow (56), the special structure of the H , which depends only on
∆iu, implies that
∑
i θ
i is also a conserved quantity, which is consistent with the interpretation
of θ in terms of probability distribution of players.
Given a convex function G(p) we define the Legendre transform as
G∗(q) = sup
p
−q · p−G(p).
If G is strictly convex and the previous supremum is achieved, then q = −∇G(p), or equivalently
p = −∇G∗(q).
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If the function F is strictly convex in θ then the Hamiltonian H is strictly convex in θ. This
allow us to consider the Legendre transform
L(u, u˙) = sup
θ
−u˙ · θ −H(u, θ)
= sup
θ
−(u˙+ h˜) · θ − F (θ) = F ∗(u˙ + h˜(∆·u, ·)).
From this we conclude that any solution to (12) is a critical point of the functional
∫ T
0
F ∗(u˙+ h˜(∆·u, ·))ds. (57)
This variational problem has to be complemented by suitable boundary conditions. The initial-
terminal value problem corresponds to
θ0 = −∇F
∗(u˙(0) + h˜(∆·u(0), ·)),
u(T ) = ψ(·,−∇F ∗(u˙(T ) + h˜(∆·u(T ), ·))).
Another important boundary condition arises in planning problems. In this case the objective
is to find a terminal cost u(T ) which steers a initial probability distribution θ0 into a terminal
probability distribution θT . Hence we have the following
θ0 = −∇F
∗(u˙(0) + h˜(∆·u(0), ·)),
θT = −∇F ∗(u˙(T ) + h˜(∆·u(T ), ·)).
The variational principle (57) is an analog to the results in [GPSM11, GSM11].
5.2 Two PDE’s for the value function
We will present now a PDE for the value function. As pointed out by Lions in his course in
College de France, as well as in [Gue11b, Gue11a] the value function of the mean field game can
be determined by solving a PDE. For this let g : Rd × Sd × Id → R
d be
g(u, θ, i) =
∑
j
θjα∗i (∆ju, θ, j).
The first equation of (12) is equivalent to d
dt
θi = g(u, θ, i).
Consider the PDE
−
∂U i
∂t
(θ, t) = h(U, θ, i) +
∑
k
g(U, θ, k)
∂U i
∂θk
(θ, t) , (58)
where U : Id × S
d × [0, T ]→ R, and the terminal condition
U i(θ, T ) = ψi(θ) . (59)
A direct computation show us that the following Proposition holds:
Proposition 8. Suppose U : Id×S
d×[0, T ]→ R is a solution of (58) and (59). Let θ : [0, T ]→ Sd
and u : [0, T ]→ Rd be two functions such that
1. the first equation of (12) is satisfied, i.e. d
dt
θi = g(u, θ, i);
2. θ(0) = θ0;
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3. ui(t) = U i(θ(t), t) .
Then u satisfies the second equation of (12), i.e. − d
dt
ui = h(∆iu, θ, i) as well as the terminal
condition ui(T ) = ψi(θ(T )). Therefore, u is the value function associated to θ, and so it determines
a Nash equilibria for the MFG.
As a consequence of the above Proposition, if U is a solution of (58) and (59), the initial value
problem {
d
dt
θi = g(U i(θ(t), t), θ, i),
θ(0) = θ0,
(60)
can be solved by the usual methods of the ODE theory to find a Nash equilibrium θ and the
associated value function ui(t) = U i(θ(t), t) , for any initial distribution θ0. Also, the function U
allows one to calculate the optimal strategies for each player, at any time. In fact the optimal
switching of a player in state i, given the distribution θ of players, is α∗j (∆iU(θ, t), θ, i), for
1 ≤ j ≤ d.
We should observe that (35) can be regarded as a discretization of (58). Indeed, set θ = n
N
and assume uin ≃ U
i(θ, t), for some smooth function U . Then, for large N , from (37) we have
γn,ikj
N
=
nk
N
α∗j
(
∆kun+eik ,
n+ eik
N
, k
)
≃ θkα∗j
(
∆kU, θ, k
)
.
Furthermore,
uin+ejk − u
i
n
1/N
=
uin+ejk − u
i
n+ej + u
i
n+ej − u
i
n
1/N
≃ −
∂U i
∂θk
+
∂U i
∂θj
.
Therefore
∑
k,j
γn,ikj (u
i
n+ejk − u
i
n) ≃
∑
k,j
θkα∗j (∆kU, θ, k)
(
∂U i
∂θj
−
∂U i
∂θk
)
=
∑
k,j
θkα∗j (∆kU, θ, k)
∂U i
∂θj
,
taking into account that
∑
j α
∗
j = 0. Observing that
∑
k,j
θkα∗j (∆kU, θ, k)
∂U i
∂θj
=
∑
j
g(U, θ, j)
∂U i
∂θj
,
and
h
(
∆iun,
n
N
, i
)
= h
(
un,
n
N
, i
)
≃ h (U, θ, i) ,
we conclude, from the above and (35), that
−
∂U i
∂t
(θ, t) ≃ h(U, θ, i) +
∑
j
g(U, θ, j)
∂U i
∂θj
(θ, t).
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For potential mean field games (58) can be further simplified if we suppose that the terminal
condition is given by a gradient
U i(θ, T ) = ∇θiΨT (i, θ) . (61)
In this case let Ψ be a solution of the PDE{
−∂Ψ
∂t
= H (∇θΨ, θ) ,
Ψ(θ, T ) = ΨT (θ) .
(62)
Then a direct calculation can show that U i(θ, t) = ∇θiΨ(θ, t) is a solution of (58) together with
the terminal condition (61). We should observe that the solutions to the Hamilton´s equations
(56) are in fact characteristic curves for (62). The Hamilton-Jacobi PDE (62) was explored in
[Gue11b, Gue11a] to the study of MFG problems on graphs.
A Auxiliary Results
Proof of Proposition 1:
To prove the first item we use the definition of h and α∗ and also that vi
∑
j
α∗j (z, θ, i) = 0 to
get
h(z, θ, i) +
∑
j
α∗j (z, θ, i) v
j = c(i, θ, α∗(z, θ, i)) +
∑
j
α∗j (z, θ, i) (z
j + vj − zi − vi) .
Hence by the definition of h(z + v, θ, i) we have
h(z, θ, i) +
∑
j
α∗j (z, θ, i) v
j ≥ h(z + v, θ, i).
From this (7) holds and we deduct that if h is differentiable
α∗j =
∂h(∆iz, θ, i)
∂zj
.
Note that item (c) is a direct corollary of item (b), since
h(p, θ, i) = c(i, θ, α∗(p, θ, i)) + α∗(p, θ, i) · p (63)
and the function c is Lipschitz in θ and differentiable in α.
From this point on in this proof we will omit the index i as it is not relevant and simplifies the
notation. To prove item (b) we will use the following inequalities, which are consequence of the
uniform convexity of c: for all θ, θ ′ ∈ Sd, α ′, α ∈ (R+0 )
d,
∑
k αk =
∑
k α
′
k = 0, and p, p
′ ∈ Rd, we
have
c(θ, α′) + α′ · p ′ ≥ c(θ, α) + α · p ′ + (∇αc(θ, α) + p ′) · (α′ − α) + γ‖α′ − α‖2, (64)
and because α∗(p, θ) is a minimizer,
(∇αc(θ, α
∗(p, θ)) + p) · (α′ − α∗(p, θ)) ≥ 0 . (65)
We will first prove that α∗ is uniformly Lipschitz in p : for that, we suppose that θ is fixed.
By the definition of α∗ and equation (64) we have
c(α∗(p)) + α∗(p) · p ′ ≥ c(α∗(p ′)) + α∗(p ′) · p ′ ≥
≥ c(α∗(p)) + α∗(p) · p ′ + (∇αc(α∗(p)) + p ′) · (α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)) + γ‖α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)‖2,
hence
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0 ≥ (∇αc(α
∗(p)) + p) · (α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)) + (p ′ − p) · (α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)) + γ‖α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)‖2.
Now using (65) we obtain
0 ≥ (p ′ − p) · (α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)) + γ‖α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)‖2.
Therefore
‖p− p ′ ‖ ‖α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)‖ ≥ γ‖α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)‖2 ,
which implies
‖α∗(p ′)− α∗(p)‖ ≤
1
γ
∥∥p ′ − p ∥∥.
This shows that α∗ is uniformly Lipschitz in p.
Now we prove that α∗ is Lipschitz in θ: for that, we suppose that p is fixed. Again by the
definition of α∗ and by equation (64) we have
c(θ ′, α∗(θ)) + α∗(θ) · p ≥ c(θ ′, α∗(θ ′)) + α∗(θ ′) · p
≥ c(θ ′, α∗(θ)) + α∗(θ) · p+ (∇αc(θ ′, α∗(θ)) + p) · (α∗(θ ′)− α∗(θ)) + γ‖α∗(θ ′)− α∗(θ)‖2,
and then
0 ≥ (∇αc(θ
′, α∗(θ)) + p) · (α∗(θ ′)− α∗(θ)) + γ‖α∗(θ ′)− α∗(θ)‖2.
Using equation (65) we get
0 ≥
[
∇αc(θ
′, α∗(θ)) −∇αc(θ, α∗(θ))
]
· (α∗(θ ′)− α∗(θ)) + γ‖α∗(θ ′)− α∗(θ)‖2.
As ∇αc(θ, α) is Lipschitz in the variable θ we have
Kc‖θ
′ − θ‖ ‖α∗(θ)− α∗(θ ′)‖ ≥ γ‖α∗(θ ′)− α∗(θ)‖2.
Therefore
‖α∗(θ)− α∗(θ ′)‖ ≤
Kc
γ
∥∥θ − θ ′∥∥ ,
which implies that α∗ is Lipschitz in θ. 
Proof of Theorem 5:
The main tool for proving Theorem 5 is once again the Dynkin Formula, now adapted to the
present situation: suppose α and β are two admissible controls.
We recall the infinitesimal generator of the process (i,n) defined in (50). We have
(Aβ,αϕ)in(s) =
∑
j
αij(n, s)[ϕ
j
n(s)− ϕ
i
n(s)] +
∑
kj
γn,iβ,kj(s)[ϕ
i
n+ejk (s)− ϕ
i
n(s)] (66)
where γβ is defined by (30).
We have that, for any function ϕ : Id × S
d
N × [0,+∞) → R, C
1 in the last variable, and any
t < T ,
E
β,α
At(i,n)
[
ϕiTnT (T )− ϕ
i
n(t)
]
= Eβ,α
At(i,n)
[∫ T
t
dϕisns
dt
(s) + (Aβ,αϕ)isns(s)ds
]
, (67)
where At(i, n) denotes the event it = i and nt = n.
Now we prove the theorem. In the Dinkyn formula (67) let ϕ = v. Using the terminal condition
viTnT (T ) = ψ
iT
(
nT
N
)
we have that, for any admissible control α,
E
β,α
At(i,n)
[
ψiT
(nT
N
)
− vin(t)
]
= Eβ,α
At(i,n)
[∫ T
t
dvis
ns
dt
(s) + (Aβ,αv)is
ns
(s)ds
]
. (68)
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In the next steps we will use the definition of u, given in (31), and then (68), (66) , (4) to have
uin(t, β, α) = E
β,α
At(i,n)
[
ψiT
(nT
N
)
+
∫ T
t
c
(
is,
ns
N
,αs
)
ds
]
= vin(t) + E
β,α
At(i,n)
∫ T
t
[
dvisns
dt
(s) + (Aβ,αv)is
ns,
(s) + c
(
is,
ns
N
,αs
)
ds
]
≥ vin(t) + E
β,α
At(i,n)

∫ T
t
dvis
ns
dt
(s) + min
µ∈(R+
0
)d
∑
j
µj [v
j
ns
(s)− vis
ns
(s)] + c
(
is,
ns
N
,µ
)
+
∑
kj
γns,isβ,kj (s)[v
is
ns+ejk
(s)− vis
ns
(s)]

 ds
= vin(t) + E
β,α
At(i,n)

∫ T
t
dvis
ns
dt
(s) + h
(
∆isv,
ns
N
, is
)
+
∑
kj
γns,isβ,kj (v
is
ns+ejk
− vis
ns
)ds


= vin(t) ,
where the last equation holds because v is a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (32). Note
that in this last calculation we are also proving that, for the specific control α˜ given by (34),
we have uin(t, β, α˜) = v
i
n(t) which show us that α˜ is the optimal control and that the objective
function uin(t, β) is given by v
i
n(t).

Proof of Proposition 6:
Let u be a solution to (32). Let u˜ = u+ ρ(T − t). Then
−
du˜in
dt
= ρ+
∑
k,j
γn,iβ,kj(u˜
i
n+ejk − u˜
i
n) + h
(
∆iu˜n,
n
N
, i
)
.
Let (i, n, t) be a minimum point of u˜ on Id × S
d
N × [0, T ]. We have u˜
i
n+ejk ≥ u˜
i
n. This implies
γn,iβ,kj(u˜
i
n+ejk − u˜
i
n) ≥ 0. We also have u˜
j
n(t)− u˜
i
n(t) ≥ 0 hence ∆iu˜n = (u˜
1
n(t)− u˜
i
n(t), ..., u˜
d
n(t) −
u˜in(t)) ≥ 0. Hence
−
du˜in
dt
(t) ≥ h
(
∆iu˜n,
n
N
, i
)
+ ρ ≥ h
(
0,
n
N
, i
)
+ ρ ,
because the definition of h(∆ip, θ, i), with ∆ip ≥ 0. Furthermore, if we take M < ρ < 2M we get
−
du˜in
dt
(t) > 0.
This shows that the minimum of u˜ is achieved at T hence
uin(t) ≥ −‖u(T )‖∞ − 2M(T − t).
Similarly, let (i, n, t) be a maximum point of u˜ on Id×S
d
N × [0, T ]. We have u˜
i
n+ejk
≤ u˜in. This
implies γn,iβ,kj(u˜
i
n+ejk
− u˜in) ≤ 0. We also have ∆iu˜n ≤ 0. Hence
−
du˜in
dt
(t) ≤ h
(
∆iu˜n,
n
N
, i
)
+ ρ ≤ h
(
0,
n
N
, i
)
+ ρ .
Furthermore, if we take −2M < ρ < −M we get
−
du˜in
dt
(t) < 0.
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This shows that the maximum of u˜ is achieved at T hence
uin(t) ≤ ‖u(T )‖∞ + 2M(T − t).

Proof Lemma 3:
Recall that α∗(p, θ, i) is Lipschitz in (p, θ). Let K be the corresponding Lipschitz constant.
Since ‖p‖ bounded, we have |α∗(p, ., .)| ≤ C. Then∣∣∣∣γn+ers,iβ,kj − γn,iβ,kj
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣(n+ ers)k α∗j(∆kun+ers+eik , n+ ers + eikN , k
)
− nk α∗j
(
∆kun+eik ,
n+ eik
N
, k
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣[(n+ ers)k − nk] α∗j(∆kun+ers+eik , n+ ers + eikN , k
)
+ nk
[
α∗j
(
∆kun+ers+eik ,
n+ ers + eik
N
, k
)
− α∗j
(
∆kun+eik ,
n+ ers + eik
N
, k
)]
+ nk
[
α∗j
(
∆kun+eik ,
n+ ers + eik
N
, k
)
− α∗j
(
∆kun+eik ,
n+ eik
N
, k
)]∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣α∗j(∆kun+ers+eik , n+ ers + eikN , k
)∣∣∣∣
+N
∣∣∣∣α∗j(∆kun+ers+eik , n+ ers + eikN , k
)
− α∗j
(
∆kun+eik ,
n+ ers + eik
N
, k
)∣∣∣∣
+N
∣∣∣∣α∗j(∆kun+eik , n+ ers + eikN , k
)
− α∗j
(
∆kun+eik ,
n+ eik
N
, k
)∣∣∣∣
≤ C +NK
∣∣∆k(un+ers+eik − un+eik)∣∣+NK
∣∣∣∣ersN
∣∣∣∣
≤ C +NK2
∥∥(uin+ers+eik − uin+eik)∥∥+ C
= C + CN
∥∥zin+eik,sr∥∥ ≤ C + CN maxrs ‖z··,sr‖∞.

Proof of Lemma 4:
Let z be a solution of (40), and fix ǫ > 0. We define z˜ = z + ǫ(t− T ). Hence z˜ satisfies
− ˙˜zm = −ǫ+
∑
m′∈Id×SdN
amm′(t)(z˜m′ − z˜m).
Let (m, t) be a maximum point of z˜ on Id ×S
d
N × [0, T ]. We have z˜m(t) ≥ z˜m′(t) and this implies
amm′(t)(z˜m′ − z˜m) ≤ 0 ∀m
′. Hence
−
dz˜m
dt
(t) ≤ −ǫ.
This shows that the maximum of z˜ is achieved at T . Therefore, for all (m′, t),
zm′(t) + ǫ(t− T ) = z˜m′(t) ≤ z˜m(T ) = zm(T ) .
Letting ǫ→ 0, we get
zm′(t) ≤ max
m
zm(T ), ∀ (m
′, t).
From this inequality we have the following conclusions:
1. if z(T ) ≤ 0, we then have zm′(t) ≤ 0 , for all (m
′, t), and so z(t) ≤ 0;
2. for all (m′, t),
zm′(t) ≤ ‖z(T )‖∞.
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Now we define z˜ = z + ǫ(T − t). Hence z˜ satisfies
− ˙˜zm = ǫ+
∑
m′∈Id×SdN
amm′(t)(z˜m′ − z˜m) .
Let (m, t) be a minimum point of z˜ on Id × S
d
N × [0, T ]. We have amm′(t)(z˜m′ − z˜m) ≥ 0.
Therefore we have
−
dz˜m
dt
(t) ≥ ǫ.
This shows that the minimum of z˜ is also achieved at T , hence for all (m′, t) we have
zm′(t) + ǫ(T − t) = z˜m′(t) ≥ z˜m(T ) = zm(T ).
Letting ǫ→ 0, we get zm′(t) ≥ min
m
zm(T ). Hence
zm′(t) ≥ −‖z(T )‖∞,
and therefore we have ‖z(t)‖∞ ≤ ‖z(T )‖∞.

Proof of Lemma 6:
We note that if t ≤ s ≤ T we have K(t, s)K(s, T ) = K(t, T ), which implies
d
ds
(
K(t, s)K(s, T )
)
= 0.
Hence, using equation (42) we get
−K(t, s)M(s)K(s, T ) +
(
d
ds
K(t, s)
)
K(s, T ) = 0,
and therefore, by taking T = s we conclude that
d
ds
K(t, s) = K(t, s)M(s). (69)
Multiplying (43) by K(t, s) and using Lemma 5, we have
−K(t, s)z˙(s) ≤ K(t, s)M(s)z(s) +K(t, s)f(z(s)) .
Using the identity
d
ds
K(t, s)z(s) = K(t, s)z˙(s) +K(t, s)M(s)z(s),
which follows from (69), we get
−
d
ds
(
K(t, s)z(s)
)
≤ K(t, s)f(z(s)).
Thus, integrating between t and T , we have
z(t)−K(t, T )z(T ) ≤
∫ T
t
K(t, s)f(z(s))ds.
Note that if z(t) = K(t, T )z(T ) is a solution of (40) with terminal data z(T ) = b, then Lemma
4 implies that ‖z(t)‖∞ ≤ ‖z(T )‖∞, hence ‖K(t, T )z(T )‖∞ ≤ ‖z(T )‖∞.
Therefore for all m ∈ Id × S
d
N we have
zm(t) ≤ ‖z(T )‖∞ +
∫ T
t
‖f(z(s))‖∞ds.
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Proof of Lemma 7:
Note that (44) implies that v is a monotone decreasing function of s and is equivalent to{
ds
dv
= −1
Cv+CNv2+ C
N
,
s(C
N
) ≤ T.
This implies by direct integration that
s
(
2C
N
)
≤ T −
∫ 2C
N
C
N
dv
Cv + CNv2 + C
N
.
Now ∫ 2C
N
C
N
dv
Cv + CNv2 + C
N
≥
∫ 2C
N
C
N
N
2C2 + 4C3 + C
dv =
1
2C + 4C2 + 1
.
Therefore if we define T ⋆ = 12C+4C2+1 , we have that s
(
2C
N
)
≤ 0 if T ≤ T ⋆. Hence this implies
v(0) ≤ 2C
N
, which yields the desired result when we take into account that v is a decreasing
function of s.

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